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SPATIAL INFORMATION AND DIAGRAMS 
 
Meghan Ertl-Bendickson 
 
[This paper received the 2011 Jakob Laub Prize in Philosophy.] 
 
Introduction 
In recent times, it has become undesirable to use diagrams 
in logical proofs. Logical proofs, even in geometry, are ideally 
purely formal representations. Recent experiments by David 
Kirshner and David Landy, however, have shown that the way in 
which we physically arrange symbols on a page when we write a 
formula affects whether or not we compute it correctly. 
Specifically, we normally place multiplied (or divided) terms 
closer together than added (or subtracted) terms – following the 
order of operations. The operations which are supposed to be 
performed first are placed physically closer together than those 
which are done later (I shall refer to this as the ―Rule of Spacing‖). 
When formula are written inconsistent with this rule, people make 
more computational errors. Landy claims that this implies, through 
his ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis and his ―syntax‖ hypothesis, that 
there are diagrammatic elements to our formal representations. I 
argue that even if these spatial relations are diagrammatic, it is not 
a problem for logic the way using a conventional diagram would 
be. However, while I agree that these results are very important 
and need to be discussed, I argue that these spatial relationships are 
not actually diagrammatic. 
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Why Diagrams are Problematic for Logic and Math 
Before we can examine Kirshner and Landy's results, we 
need to understand some background information about diagrams 
and why, exactly, it is no longer considered acceptable to use them 
in logical proofs. Diagrams were originally developed, in the times 
of Ancient Greece, for use in cartography and to find ways to 
accurately measure spaces and distances. This means that the first 
diagrams were meant to describe contingent, extensional properties 
of the real world. ―Geometry as a discipline originated in the need 
to solve problems concerned with distances and areas in surveying 
and cartography. Its subject matter was therefore the physical 
features of the world, and the logical relationship its conclusions 
bore to these features was therefore contingent, akin to that of any 
physical theory.‖ 1 They were used to deal with specific instances 
in space and time, for instance mapping a real landscape in a 
particular area. Geometry developed out of these issues.  
However, it has since become something quite different. A 
critical change came when Descartes presented to us a way to 
describe geometric diagrams algebraically, allowing us to convert 
diagrams into formal representations.
2
 This was beneficial to the 
study of geometry in a number of ways. It allowed geometry to 
directly profit from advances made in the rest of mathematics, so 
that if a new discovery were made elsewhere it could be applied to 
geometry, as well. It also solved the issue, which had been 
recognized for many, many years, that relying too completely on a 
diagram can cause error solely because the actual diagrams we 
                                                 
1
 Greaves, Mark. 2002. The philosophical status of diagrams. (Stanford, Calif: 
CSLI Publications), 77 
2
 Ibid., 78 
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draw are fallible. No drawing of a triangle is ever going to be a 
perfect triangle, so basing your calculations on a specific drawing 
of a triangle can cause mistakes. Working instead with the algebra 
allows us to talk about ―perfect‖ geometric shapes, without having 
to worry about whether our diagrams are accurate. Finally, though, 
Descartes allowed us to begin to discuss things that are not 
visualizable or intuitable. Geometry was no longer restricted to the 
domain of things that humans are capable of visualizing. We can 
talk, now, of 5-dimensional objects, or shapes with more sides than 
we can picture, etc. This final point makes it clear that geometry 
had begun to move away from its original purpose – the study of 
the real world and extensional, contingent spaces.
3
  
Another shift came with the discovery of Non-Euclidean 
geometry. ―After this discovery, it was unclear whether the 
theorems of geometry could even be considered to be true of 
objects of the world, let alone descriptive of their necessary 
properties, because of the uncertainty about the world's actual 
geometry.‖ 4 Now there were actual aspects of geometry that 
specifically did not relate to our experience of the world. In fact, 
we were now left a little uneasy about the exact nature of our 
world – what kind of geometry do we actually have? We had 
assumed that there was only this one type of geometry based on 
rules which govern the real world. But now we could see that there 
were others, which follow different rules, leaving us unsure as to 
which one we actually live in. And for those types of geometry that 
do not represent our world, no diagram could now be of use to us. 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 78 
4
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Diagrams had at one point been essential to the study of geometry, 
but since then the development of geometry itself has tended in a 
direction in which diagrams can no longer be of substantive use.  
Greaves discusses a number of the fundamental reasons 
diagrams cannot serve a real purpose in logical proofs. The first 
involves the ―requirement of indeterminacy of interpretation.‖5 
Basically, diagrams inherently impose one interpretation on a 
problem, but there may be others. Using solely formal 
representations keeps us from becoming biased towards one 
particular interpretation. The second reason is slightly more subtle 
and more pertinent to our present discussion. Logicians, 
mathematicians, etc have wanted very much to keep psychological 
processes out of our rules of reasoning. ―...the consensus among 
nineteenth-century mathematicians that proofs in any sort of 
mathematics be free of any dependency on facts unique to our 
particular psychology...‖6 Logic is meant to be objectively true, 
independent of particular human cognition. If the rules of logic are 
based on a particular human psychological process, then it 
functions only for human beings, not for the objective world. 
Further, if a rule of logic is based on a quirk of human cognition, 
we cannot be entirely sure it is true. We want to describe the world 
as it objectively is, not the world as we subjectively experience it.  
The most fundamental problem for diagrams, however, has 
to do with a very basic assumption of logic. A logical proof is 
meant to be as broad as possible. A proof is not valid if it works 
only for one particular instance on one particular day, or if it 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 80 
6
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functions only for one discipline but not others. ―A single 
fundamental principle has been at the center of the way that 
logicians from Aristotle to Frege have structured their accounts – 
namely, that the scope of a legitimate logical theory should be as 
broad and general as possible...logic should not be artificially 
limited in its domain of applicability, and thus it should attempt to 
model whatever is common about reasoning broadly conceived, 
however small that common fraction may be.‖ 7 We do not want 
one system of logic for biology, one for chemistry, and another for 
philosophy. Logic is meant to be a tool applied across all 
disciplines to make sure that all disciplines are consistent with the 
real world, not just with our own thoughts. Greaves calls this the 
principle of maximal scope. Diagrams, we have seen, were 
developed for a purpose in direct opposition to this. Diagrams were 
meant to describe specific, contingent instances, not broad 
axiomatic laws. This makes diagrams fundamentally at odds with 
the aim of logic.  
 
Visual Elements in Formal Representations 
So, we can see now why it has seemed so important to 
remove all aspects of diagram from our formal representations. 
Diagrams are contingent, so any diagrammatic element of a formal 
representation is a potential weakness to the proof. It is a point at 
which we cannot be sure the proof is following the principle of 
maximal scope or that it is detached from our psychological 
processes. Kirshner and Landy's experiments, however, highlight 
the possibility of just such an element. When we write a formula 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 194 
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on the page, certainly that is a visual object. We may call it 
'writing' instead of 'drawing', but we must admit that both are 
visually processed and involve spatial relationships on the page. So 
we need to clearly distinguish what makes something a formal 
representation on a page, and what makes it a diagram.  
Landy describes two distinctions that have been made. The 
first is the concept of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic 
representations. Diagrams are intrinsic representations, because the 
truth I am trying to show with my diagram is intrinsic to the 
diagram itself. I can draw a diagram illustrating that line A is 
longer than line B by drawing one line longer than the other – the 
difference in lengths of the lines is inherent to the drawing. In a 
formula, however, all of the symbols involved are arbitrary. The 
truth I am trying to show is extrinsic to the symbols I make – when 
I say 1+1=2, nothing about any of those squiggles on the page is 
inherently related to the numbers involved or the process of 
addition. The drawing of the lines, on the other hand, is not 
arbitrary.
8
  
Another way of getting at this difference is to say that 
diagrams are direct representations, whereas formal representations 
are indirect. The formula 1+1=2 is indirect because I arrive at the 
truth of the statement only through knowledge of outside laws 
(what the symbol '1' means, what the rule of addition is, etc). But 
in the diagram of the lines, the truth directly shown to me through 
the symbols involved. I need no outside knowledge (besides 
knowing the definition of 'longer') to understand what is being 
                                                 
8
 Landy, David, and Robert L. Goldstone. 2007. "Formal notations are diagrams: 
Evidence from a production task". Memory & Cognition. 35 (8): 2033. 
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stated.
9
 What both of these theories are getting at is the idea of 
arbitrariness. Formal representations are arbitrary, diagrams are 
not. So in order to decide whether something is diagrammatic or 
formal using these definitions, we have to ask whether it is 
arbitrary, direct, and intrinsic.  
Landy aims to show that there are diagrammatic elements 
to formal representations by showing how the spatial relationships 
between our arbitrary symbols on the page reflect the processes 
going on in our calculations and also how making those 
relationships differ from our norm causes us to make errors. ―…the 
rule system that governs the interpretation of formal systems carry 
functional spatial information – in other words, they are 
diagrammatic.‖ 10 Before Landy published his papers, Kirshner11  
published a paper examining the curious fact that when people 
write out formulas, they place operands closer together or farther 
apart in reflection of the order of operations. So, 1+2x3=7 tends to 
be written 1 + 2x3 = 7, with the multiplied terms placed spatially 
closer together on the page than the added terms. He wished to see 
if this spatial grouping affected the way we compute, or in other 
words, if these spatial relationships inform the steps we take to 
solve an equation.
12
  
To do this, Kirshner made a system called a Nonce 
Notation, which is a system of arithmetic completely divorced 
from any of the symbols we currently use. This Nonce Notation 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 2033 
10
 Ibid., 2038 
11
 Kirshner, David. 1989. "The Visual Syntax of Algebra". Journal for Research 
in Mathematics Education. 20 (3): 274-287. 
12
 Ibid., 287 
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had two difference versions. The first was ―unspaced‖, the second 
was ―spaced‖. The unspaced version had nothing in common with 
our current notation, the spaced version was exactly the same as 
unspaced, except following this Rule of Spacing we apparently 
use. So the two systems were thus: 
 
Current Unspaced Spaced 
a+b aAb a  A  b 
a-b aSb a  S  b 
axb aMb a M b 
a/b aDb a D b 
a^b aEb aEb 
b aRb aRb 
 
In the spaced version, the operations which are supposed to be 
performed first are placed closer together than those which should 
be performed last, just like what we tend to do when writing in our 
own notational system.
13
  
Kirshner took a group of highschool students and first 
tested them on how well they understood math in our current 
notational system. Those who made minimal errors on the test then 
went on to take the same type of test, except using the Nonce 
Notation. The first test was unspaced, the second was spaced. 
These were students who understood the laws of math and the 
order of operations, so any mistakes they made would mostly be 
due to having trouble with the new notation. He compared the 
scores of the first, unspaced test to the scores of the spaced test and 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 277 
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found that indeed, students did much better when the notation was 
spaced. Since the only difference between the two was the spacing, 
it had to be the spacing itself which made their scores go up.
14
 This 
spacing, which is reflective of the order of operations, does seem 
to inform our calculations. It is not irrelevant.  
David Landy did a series of experiments to follow through 
on these findings. In his first experiment, he tested how well 
people could judge the truth of a statement when the spacing of it 
was inconsistent (meaning, when the statement did not follow the 
Rule of Spacing). So he asked people (in his case, college 
students), whether a series of statements were true or false. Some 
were consistent (i.e., does  ―axb  +  cxd‖ necessarily equal ―cxd  +  
axb‖? For which the answer is yes), and some were inconsistent 
(i.e., does ―a+b  x  c+d‖ necessarily equal ―c+d  x  a+b‖? For 
which the answer is no). He found that people made six times as 
many errors when the spacing was inconsistent.
15
 Inconsistent 
spacing apparently interferes with people‘s ability to judge the 
truth of a statement. 
Next, Landy tested whether people really do consistently 
add these spacings to statements when they write or type them out. 
First he wrote out formulas in words (so, ―one plus one equals 
two‖) and asked his participants to write the same formula out in 
symbols (―1+1=2‖). He found that people did indeed place 
multiplied items closer together than added items.
16
 Thinking 
perhaps this was a quirk of handwriting having something to do 
with the length of time it takes a person to think about the formula 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., 282 
15
 Landy, Formal Notations as Diagrams, 2034 
16
 Ibid., 2034 
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(meaning perhaps the gaps were due to a pause in thought), he 
tested whether the same would happen when typing on a computer. 
This time, participants were asked to convert English sentences 
into logical symbols (―if Jack is happy, then Jill is happy‖ would 
then become ―A → B‖). Again, however, people left spaces 
between groups reflective of the order of operations. So the 
spacing was present whether the formal sentences were 
handwritten or typed.
17
  
Lastly, Landy tested how spacing affects people's ability to 
correctly solve formulae.  First he had them solve simple 
expressions with just one operator – so, 1+1, or 2x3. Again, these 
were either consistently or inconsistently spaced. He found that the 
spacing mattered mainly for addition. For formulae where addition 
was the operator, when the spacing was wider than normal 
participants tended to overestimate, but when the spacing was 
narrow, they tended to underestimate (Proximity, 13). The last 
experiment involved compound computations, with more than one 
operator (i.e. 1+2x3=7). He found that inconsistent spacing led to 
errors in selecting the correct operation – operands placed closer 
together tended to be multiplied and operands placed farther apart 
tended to be added regardless of what the operator actually was.
18
  
Landy proposed hypotheses to explain these phenomena 
beyond simply ascribing it to reflecting the order of operations. He 
wanted to say that this is not just a representation of the rule itself, 
but rather a spatial reflection of the cognitive processes that we use 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 2036 
18
 Landy D., and Goldstone R.L. 2010. "Proximity and Precedence in 
Arithmetic". Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 63 (10): 1953-
1968, 18 
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to follow the rule. For the simple expressions, he proposed what he 
called the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis. He speculated that we all 
have a ―mental number line‖ in our heads and when we do addition 
(but not multiplication), we start at the first number and ―move‖ 
ourselves along the line the required number of steps and then see 
where we end up.
19
 So for 1+1=2, I would start at one on my 
mental number line and then take one step forward. I see that I 
landed at two, and therefore know that the answer is two. But when 
spacing is abnormally wide or narrow, it influences my perception 
of the question so that I overestimate or underestimate the correct 
response, respectively. Thus the spacing of the formula on the page 
is a visual representation of the act of walking along my mental 
number line. 
For the compound expressions, Landy offers a somewhat 
more subtle explanation. He claims that when terms are grouped 
closer together, it is a spatial representation of how syntactically 
bound together they are (I shall call this the ―syntax‖ hypothesis). 
―...if, as we suggest, understanding formal symbol structures 
typically involves spatial resources, then symbolic productions 
might be expected to reflect syntactic structure: The less tightly 
two adjacent terms are bound syntactically, the farther apart they 
should be placed physically.‖ 20 In the expression 1+2x3, 2 and 3 
are more tightly syntactically bound than 2 and 1, so I place 2 
closer to 3 than to 1 as a visual representation of that tightness.  
 
 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., 10 
20
 Landy, Formal Notations as Diagrams, 2034 
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The Rule of Spacing and the Principle of Maximal Scope 
If these are in fact diagrammatic elements in our formal 
representation, we have to ask what this shows. We have striven to 
remove diagrams from our computations and proofs because 
historically, diagrams were meant to represent contingent objects, 
relations, etc. Because they are contingent, they cannot follow the 
principle of maximal scope, which means whenever possible we 
should avoid them in order to keep our math and logic as broad as 
is possible. The other problem with the Rule of Spacing is that they 
seem to represent, according to Landy's hypotheses, our cognitive 
processes. We have tried hard to remove any psychological factors 
from math and logic, because, again, we do not want math or logic 
to be contingent on the human mind. Theoretically, another species 
ought to be able to use logic exactly the way we do. It ought not to 
work only for human beings.  
However, we cannot just reject the Rule of Spacing solely 
because it is diagrammatic. We need to ask whether this is indeed a 
weakness, whether it does fall prey to the above problems. I argue 
that if these tendencies are diagrammatic, they do in fact still 
follow the principle of maximal scope exactly the same way that 
any arbitrary, formal representation would, and thus are not in fact 
a problem we ought to eliminate. These diagrams are of a different 
sort than, say, a drawing of a triangle. Yes, they are a reflection of 
the cognitive processes we use to solve equations, but so is the plus 
sign or the equals sign. These things are symbolic ways of 
communicating the steps we take to solve an equation, and if they 
are standardized, the way the equals sign is, we eliminate most the 
problems psychological interference might cause. They are not 
representations of contingent, extensional objects or relations in 
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the material world like our diagrams in cartography were. So while 
we have diagrammatic elements in our formal representations, it is 
not problematic in the same way. 
 
Why the Rule of Spacing Does Not Yield Diagrams 
I do not, however, fully support the idea that these are 
diagrammatic elements – specifically because of the differences 
between them and conventional diagrams mentioned above. 
Certainly they are visual and imagistic. But not all images are 
necessarily diagrams – all of our arbitrary symbols we use in 
formal notations are also imagistic in that they communicate their 
information visually. The distinction we have made is that 
diagrams are direct and intrinsic. For the ―longer is larger‖ 
hypothesis, there could be ways to directly represent that. If we do 
perform addition by walking a ―mental number line‖, a direct 
representation of this would involve making the spaces between 
symbols bigger for formulas in which the numbers involved are 
bigger; so we might have 1+1=2, and 3    +    5    =    8. This is a 
direct representation of our mental number line: we have to go 
further down it to get to 8 than we do to get to 2, so the formula 
directly represents this by spacing the numbers farther apart.  
But this is not what Landy shown. In fact, what he has 
shown is the exact opposite. He proved that there is a common 
distance we put between the symbols, and that when that distance 
is inconsistent, it throws us off and we come up with the wrong 
answer. This may be proof that we are walking a mental number 
line and that that is how we do addition, but it is not proof that the 
Rule of Spacing is diagrammatic. We have a consistent distance, 
and any deviation from that distance is problematic. So while the 
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spatial relations of the symbols on the page are important, they are 
not any sort of direct representation, and thus are not 
diagrammatic.  
For the ―syntax‖ hypothesis, there is more of a sense in 
which the spatial relationships Landy found are direct. We are 
saying that two terms are closer together syntactically, and so we 
place them physically closer together on the page. This seems like 
a direct representation, or at least, it certainly does not seem 
arbitrary. However, the idea of two things being ―more tightly 
syntactically bound‖21 is not a reference to a spatial relationship in 
the first place. The word ―close‖ is misleading – we are referring 
here to a different kind of closeness. Saying two things are closer 
syntactically is different than saying Minneapolis is closer to 
Chicago than to Paris. There is no real physical distance involved 
in syntax, and there never could be, because syntax is not a 
physical object to begin with.  
What do we mean by ―syntactic closeness‖, then? We may 
say that being ―more tightly bound‖ is referring to temporal 
distance, in that the terms are more tightly bound because they are 
dealt with first and are therefore temporally closer together 
(―tighter‖), but then we are right back to referring directly to the 
order of operations. They are only temporally closer together 
because the rule of the order of operations says they should be, and 
if these spacings are only reflective of our rule, then they are most 
certainly not diagrammatic, unless we want to say that parentheses 
(which are also only reflective of the order of operations) are also 
diagrammatic. The spacing would then only be an arbitrary symbol 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., 2034 
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of the rule, the same way that addition and multiplication symbols 
are arbitrary symbols of their own respective rules. If we think 
about the order of operations and what it actually says, there is 
nothing about physical closeness that directly implies it the way 
saying a diagram represents that line A is shorter than line B 
because I have physically drawn line A shorter than line B. The 
Rule of Spacing, as a representation of the order of operations, is 
intuitively helpful, but not intrinsic. Again, for these spacings to be 
diagrammatic and not merely imagistic, they have to represent 
something in a direct way, and for these reasons if they are only 
representative of the order of operations, they do not.  
Taking a step back, we have to further note that Landy has 
not in fact proved either the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis or the 
―syntax‖ hypothesis. He has shown that the spatial relationships 
between the symbols on the page affect the way we compute 
formulae. He has not shown why this is the case – that would 
require a whole different type of experiment. These two 
hypotheses might be plausible explanations, but they have not yet 
been proven or even strongly supported. Perhaps the Rule of 
Spacing is only a symbol of the order of operations, and thus 
arbitrary. Perhaps it is not indicative of some deeper cognitive 
process. Again, we use parentheses in algebra to help us follow the 
order of operations, and we do not consider those to be 
diagrammatic, even though they (like any other symbol, even the 
numbers) are visual.  
The underlying point here is that just because something is 
visual does not mean it is diagrammatic. The requirement for 
something to be diagrammatic, by Landy's own standards, is that it 
is direct and intrinsic. In order for him to support his claim that 
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there are diagrammatic elements to formal representations, he 
needs not only to prove that the way symbols are arranged on the 
page affects the way we think, but also that the spatial relations 
involved are direct representations and not merely arbitrary 
symbols. Without this second step, all he has shown is that 
formulae are imagistic and that there is an aspect of that trait that 
affects the way we compute that we have not yet acknowledged. 
 
The Import of the Data 
I am not, however, dismissing the findings of Kirshner and 
Landy as insignificant. I believe it is still highly important to 
examine what their results mean. The issue I see for the disciplines 
of mathematics and logic is not that we have diagrams in our 
formal representations, but rather that we have implicit rules at 
play. It seems that an undiscussed rule has developed and been 
passed from teacher to student, and that it is powerful enough to 
cause people to make computational errors when it is disobeyed. 
Why the rule developed in the first place, which is what Landy is 
discussing with his two hypotheses, is an important and interesting 
question, but not necessarily relevant to mathematicians, logicians 
or philosophers. For those disciplines, the fact that the rule exists is 
the crux of the issue.  
There are two ways we may address the Rule of Spacing: 
We may either actively suppress it, which requires explicit 
discussion of its existence and then for teachers to make certain 
they are not subconsciously passing it on to their students; or it 
needs to be defined and standardized, the same as the rule of 
addition or the order of operations. Without doing either of these, 
our psychological processes are interfering with our computations 
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in exactly the way we fear. The math or logic we do is being 
influenced by subconscious mental processes, and there may be 
differences in this from person to person. Perhaps what is ―close 
together‖ or ―far apart‖ for one person is different for another, and 
so when that first person writes out a formula in what they think is 
consistent with the Rule of Spacing, it is inconsistent for the 
second person, causing them to make a computational error. But if 
we make the rule explicit, perhaps standardize the distances 
between operands and particular operators, then this would 
hopefully minimize the interference of our own subjective 
psychologies.  
There are, as Landy points out
22
, a number of benefits to 
this rule, such that perhaps we ought not to bemoan its presence. 
The fact of the matter is that we are not purely linguistic beings. 
We also necessarily process information through our senses, since 
that is how we acquire it. This is unavoidable. For the purposes of 
written logic and mathematics, this means we process the 
information visually as well as linguistically. So incorporating 
visual elements into our rules might make it easier for us to process 
the information we are trying to convey. Particularly, when we first 
teach a student arithmetic, making the order of operations a spatial 
as well as a syntactic rule might make it easier to remember and 
follow. This would minimize the number of mistakes we make 
when computing formulae and help us learn faster.  
In fact, the rule could be helpful for teachers as well as 
students.
23
 If we had such a visual rule representing the steps we 
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took to compute a formula, a teacher could more easily see why a 
student got the wrong answer on a test or assignment. If a student 
writes 2  x  2+3=10, it is most likely that he or she did not follow 
the order of operations correctly and thus the teacher can much 
more easily correct and instruct him or her. On the other hand, if 
the student writes 2x2  +  3=10, it is of course still possible that he 
or she does not understand the rule of operations, but it is also 
more possible that there is some other error responsible. Basically, 
this visual rule is a way of representing the steps we took to solve 
an equation, the same way we use parentheses. So, it can 
communicate more efficiently to a teacher whether a student 
correctly understands the rule.  
 
Conclusion 
For many years, logicians and mathematicians have worked 
to remove diagrams from logical proofs and formulae for the 
reason that diagrams, due to the nature of their origins, do not 
follow the principle of maximal scope. We have drawn a strict 
distinction between diagrams, which are intrinsic and direct, and 
formal representations, which are extrinsic and indirect, or 
arbitrary. Kirshner and Landy, among others, have rather 
convincingly shown, however, that there are relevant spatial 
relationships to our formal representations – mainly, we tend to 
spatially represent the order of operations by placing physically 
closer together those operations which ought to be performed first. 
Landy explains these tendencies using what he calls the ―longer is 
larger‖ hypothesis in simple expressions, and what I have called 
the ―syntax‖ hypothesis in compound expressions. Because these 
spatial relationships so strongly affect the way we compute, Landy 
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claims they are diagrammatic.  
I argue that if this were so, these diagrammatic elements 
would in fact follow the principle of maximal scope and therefore 
not be a problem the way a diagram of a triangle, for instance, is. I 
further argue, however, that even though the Rule of Spacing is 
visual and imagistic, it is not diagrammatic because the way it 
represents the information it is conveying is not direct or intrinsic. 
Regardless, the Rule of Spacing is currently an unacknowledged 
rule affecting the way we compute, which is problematic and needs 
to be addressed.   
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